Practically out of control

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In favor of compositional directives

- Forms marked for 'directivity' (practical, non-descriptive, performative use)
- What exactly is encoded and how?
- Differences between constructions within one and across languages
- Isolating the relevant parameters from specific patterns ascribed to the relevant forms

Outline

Practical infelicity 1: 'Practical Moore Sentences'

- Directives clauses ('orders') conjoined with avowal of them coming true are infelicitous

  Mandelkern 2019; building on Ninan 2005

  (1)   a.   You { must/have to } turn in your final paper by the end of the exam period,
        b.   Turn your final paper in by the end of the exam period,
        c.   I order you to turn in your final paper by the end of the exam period,

        #but I don't know if you will turn your paper in by then.

- Mandelkern: similar to classical Moore paradox

  (2)   #It's raining but I don't believe it's raining.

- there are many situations 'in which practical Moore sentences can be true' (like classical) [. . .] 'in which they can be believed and known; and in which either conjunct, on its own, can be felicitously asserted' (unlike classical) [. . .]
  ⇒ 'Not an issue of content'

Practical Moore sentences as posturing failures

- 'order together with an avowal of agnosticism about whether the order will be obeyed' (schema: $\text{ORDER}(\phi) \land \text{OPEN}(\neg\phi)$)
- Posturing: 'When you order someone to ϕ, you must act towards them as if you believe that they will ϕ.'
  ($\approx$ *"Fake it or you won't make it!"*, p.c. Si Kai Lee)

'Not an issue of semantics'

- Mandelkern argues that Practical Moore sentences are semantically unproblematic:

1. Intuitively believeable and knowable, nothing wrong with thinking that they won't obey

2. No Practical Moore sentences with descriptive uses

3. Practical Moore sentences are fine in embedded occurrences

- Finding: His arguments aren't equally applicable to all linguistic types of Practical Moore sentences $\Rightarrow$ suggests a role for coventional encoding after all.

No practical Moore effect in non-order (descriptive) uses

- Practical Moore sentences involve performative uses; modals also have descriptive uses (Kamp, 1973; Lewis, 1979)
- With overt source modification (3) and without (4b):

  (3)   According to local custom, you have to take exactly two lumps of sugar in your coffee. But you should not feel bound by local custom, and for all I know you will take more than two!   (his 33)

  (4)   a.   [Client:] what is my legal obligation, and what do you expect me to do?
        b.   [Lawyer:] You have to report your liability, but I don't know if you will; you may prefer to push the limits of the law and just conceal it.   (his 34)

- But: *must* does not like to be descriptive in the absence of overt modification (Ninan, 2005) (*must*: (3) ✓, (4b): #)
- Imperatives lack descriptive uses and dislike overt source modification:

  (5)   Take two lumps of sugar! (– reactions: #That's (not) true./#She made an assertion.) (Kaufmann, 2019a)

  (6)   #According to local custom, take exactly two lumps of sugar.

Mandelkern: No Practical Moore with non-order imperatives

- Acquiescence: no Practical Moore sentences. – But general 'absence of commitment' move that seems to be free from any usual standards (≈ speech act denegation, Krifka 2014)

  (7) a. Close the window! Don't close the window! I don't care at all.
      b. You might close the window; but close it, don't close it, what do I care?

  (8) a. You closed the window, you didn't close the window, I don't care at all.
      b. You have to close the window, you don't have to close the window, I don't care at all.

- Permissions behave more like disjunctions for Practical Moore part:

  (9) a. You can have only one piece of fruit. Have a pear! Have an apple! I don't know which one you'll take.   his (39)
      b. #. . . I know you might not take one.

- Imperatives cannot be pushed into descriptive uses, and in all committing uses, Practical Moore sentences result (*to be refined*).

Distancing Ban (Practical Infelicity 2)

- Frank (1996) finds different analogue between deontic modality and classical Moore sentences:

  (10)   #You should go to Paris, but I don't advise you to.

- For imperatives, Kaufmann (2012) (term from Stegovec and Kaufmann 2015):

  (11)   #Go to Paris, but I absolutely don't want you to.

- Again, modals escape with overt (*must*), some also covert (*have to*), source modification.

Crosslinguistic comparison

- Pratical infelicities persist for imperatives as investigated so far
- Modals can replicate differences as found between *must* and *have to*,
  e.g. Japanese *beki* vs. *nakerebanaranai*
  Suggests: class of default subjective modals.

Japanese *beki* vs. *nakerebanaranai*

On-going joint work with Stefan Kaufmann, Teruyuki Mizuno, and Muyi Yang.

- Unmodified: *beki*: both practical infelicities; *nakereba naranai* –:

  (12)   Jiroo wa asita   ronbu o   { a. das-ana-kereba
         Jiroo TOP tomorrow paper ACC   hand.in-NEG-COND
         nar-ana-i./   b. #das-u   beki da.   } Demo,
         become-NEG-NPST./   hand.in-NPST BEKI COP.NPST   but,
         kitto   das-ana-i.
         most.likely hand.in-NEG-NPST
         'Jiroo has to hand in this paper tomorrow. But most likely he won't.'

  (13)   Jiroo wa asita   ronbu o   { a. das-ana-kereba
         Jiroo TOP tomorrow paper ACC   hand.in-NEG-COND
         nar-ana-i./   b. #das-u   beki da.   } Demo
         become-NEG-NPST./   hand.in-NPST BEKI COP.NPST   but
         hontoo wa   soo site hosi-kuna-i
         really TOP so do want-NEG-NPST)
         'Jiroo has to hand in this paper tomorrow. But I absolutely don't want
         him, too.'

- Overt source modficiation: nominalization under *no da* makes *beki*
  acceptable (also preferred for *nakereba naranai*, (Kaufmann and
  Tamura, 2020))

Form – Context – Practical Infelicities?

Tolerance of matrix level 'but maybe not ϕ' (agnosticism tolerance):

Item	Unmodified matrix	Modified matrix	Compl. clause
have to (E)	✓	✓	✓
nakerebanarani (J)	✓	✓	✓
must (E)	–	✓	✓
beki (J)	–	✓	✓
Imperatives	–	–	✓ / ⋆

Mandelkern updated

- Practical Moore Sentences reflect a conflict at the layer of conversational moves (speech acts) ✓

- Some forms are constrained to Moore paradoxical uses (a matter of semantics after all)
  (i) generally: imperatives [*to be revised*],
  (ii) absent overt modification: *must* (E), *beki* (J) (default-subjective modals)

- Practical Moore Sentences result from a conflict in conversational moves, but the tie to the relevant directive-like conversational move is conventionally encoded in some forms (imperatives, (to some extent) default-subjective modals).

Conventionally directive (ORDER)?

- Are forms that cannot avoid the Practical Moore paradox marked conventionally as orders/directives?

- But imperatives can be used non-directively, e.g.:

  (14) a. A: How do I get to Harlem? – B: Take the A-train.

                                        Disinterested Advice
        b. Have another cookie!   Invitations ('Permission')
        c. A: Can I open the window? – B: Sure, open it.
        d. Please be blond!   Wish

- One attempt at an underspecified semantics: Modal Operator Account
  (a.o. Schwager 2006; Kaufmann 2012, 2019a; Grosz 2009; Oikonomou 2016;
  Francis t.a., Ihara 2019; see e.g. Portner 2005, Condoravdi and Lauer 2012 for
  alternatives and Kaufmann 2021 for recent discussion)

  – Modal operator, underspecified in modal flavor (Kratzer, 1981, 1991, 2012)
  – Presuppositional restrictions on the modal flavor
    (Note: default-subjective modals seem to (partly) share these as
    preferences/defaults)

Classifying imperative speech acts

- All but wish-imperatives are practical: convey what to do (solution to decision problem)
- Wish-imperatives are severely restricted. . .

Wish imperatives don't come for free

- '[. . .] *only if it is taken for granted that speaker and addressee have no influence on the realization of the content.*'   Condoravdi & Lauer 2012
- Settled prejacents (*please*/imploring intonation):

  (15) a. Please have the keys with you!
        b. Please don't have broken another vase!
        c. Please be rich!
        d. Please don't be dead, Ginny!   J. K. Rowling

- Limited, language-specific inventory of well-wishes, in the addressee's interest, lack of full control taken for granted (#*please*, Marley Beaver, p.c.)

  (16) a. Get well soon!
        b. Have a good life!
        c. Get work done on the train!   Command, ??Wish

Interpreting modals and directives

- Prioritizing modals and imperatives are indexed for the contextually salient prioritizing modal flavor R

  (17)   a.   You must close the door!
         b.   Close the door!

  – both translate to: $\Box^R$ close(you,the-door)
  – the proposition expressed in a context c is true at a world w iff the addressee$_c$ closes the door in all w' s.t. w' is R_c-accessible from w.

Performative contexts

- Modals '*must* ϕ'
  is used performatively in a performative context, else, it is used descriptively.

- Imperative '$\mathrm{ImpOP}\ \phi$'
  presupposes that the context is performative (by uttering an imperative, the speaker becomes publicly commited to believing that their context has the required properties).

- Speakers become publicly committed to believing the proposition expressed, but not an assertion at speech act level (Stalnaker, 1978; Kaufmann, 2019a).

Gap between knowledge and action

(Kaufmann, 2019b)

- Performative contexts involve an interplay between a Director (source of practical knowledge) and Instigator (Agent in control of course of events)
- Regular second person matrix imperatives:
  Director = Speaker
  Instigator = Addressee

Performative contexts for 2p modals and imperatives

- EAC and EUC are mutual joint belief:

(EAC) Epistemic Authority Condition
Director (= Speaker) has perfect knowledge of what is necessary w.r.t. salient prioritizing modal flavor R.

(EUC) Epistemic Uncertainty Condition
(If not for their current utterance), Director (= Speaker) holds possible ϕ and $\neg\phi$.

- and the context is either
  - practical: Question under Discussion is a decision problem for the Addressee (= Instigator) and contextually salient modal flavor R is decisive,

    (*to be unpacked*)
  - or the context cannot be construed as practical and is expressive: R encodes the Director's (Speaker's) effective preferences (realistic, consistent, Condoravdi and Lauer 2012)

Decisive Modality (DM) (hallmark of practical contexts)

- Given context set CS (the set of worlds compatible with mutual joint belief) and a salient partition Δ on CS, a modal flavor R is decisive iff it constitutes the contextually agreed upon criteria to choose the perferred cell.

- Δ is a decision problem for an Instigator α iff
  for all $q \in \Delta$, try$(\alpha, q) \cap CS \neq \emptyset$ and control(α, q),
  where control$(\alpha, q) := $ try$(\alpha, q) \rightarrow$ cause(α, q)

- R being the decisive modality in a context c implies:
  - If $\Box^R q$, no participant in c effectively prefers $\neg q$.
  - If Δ is a decision problem for participant α, α tries to find out if $\Box^R q$ for any $q \in \Delta$.
  - If participant α learns that $\Box^R q$ for $q \in \Delta$, α tries to realize q.

Kaufmann and Kaufmann 2012

Imperatives are functionally inhomogeneous (practical)

- Close the door.   practical, R = the speaker's orders
- A: How do I get to Harlem? – B: Take the A-train. practical, R = the addressee's goals
  (Disinterested) Advice: no speaker preference (ok: neutral)
- Have a seat.   practical, R = the addressee's desires
  Invitation: no speaker preference (ok: neutral)
    For details, Kaufmann 2012. Alternative: R = speaker's preferences + possibility, Oikonomou 2016
- A: I'm cold, can I close the window? – B: Sure, (go ahead), close it.
                                                  practical, R = the addressee's goals
  (Disinterested) Advice: no speaker preference (ok: neutral)

Imperatives are functionally inhomogeneous (expressive)

- Please be rich!   expressive, settled, $R =$ the speaker's effective preferences
  Imperative wishes/Settled wishes: no control (note: A can be absent)
- Please jump!!!!   expressive, not settled, soliloquy $R =$ the speaker's effective preferences

Predictions for practical infelicities

- All imperatives are subject to the Distancing Ban (practical infelicity 2)
- All <u>practical</u> imperatives yield Practical Moore Sentences (practical infelicity 1)
  This follows from proposition expressed $+$ EAC $+$ decisive modality.
- But <u>expressive</u> imperatives (wishes) are not predicted to yield Practical Moore Sentences; seems borne out:

  (18)   a.   Omg, where are you, please be in that room!!!
             b.   I dont know where the keys are please have them with you!!!

- Modal verbs are predicted to be subject to one or both practical infelicities depending on what modal flavor they combine with.

  <u>Tentatively</u>: In the absence of overt source modification, *must* and *beki* anchor to the flavor relevant for imperatives.

Additional favorable predictions

- (Practical) imperatives are alternative-sensitive, QUD = set of possible courses of action, predictions about discourse behavior (Kaufmann and Kaufmann, 2021)

- Embedded imperatives: Director = Matrix subject, presuppositions anchored to reported context (Kaufmann, 2012)

   (19)   Rekel (ti)   je, da mu   pomagaj.
           said.M (2.DAT) is that 3.M.DAT help.IMP.(2)
           'He$_i$ said (to you) that you should help him$_{i,k}$.'
                                   Slovenian, Sheppard and Golden (2002)

   (20)   John$_i$ said call his$_{i,k}$ father. $^{\%}$English, Crnič and Trinh (2009)

Generalized subject obviation   (Stegovec, 2019)

- Setting Director = Instigator amounts to contradictory commitments:
  knows and doesn't know that *p* will happen, (Kaufmann, 2019b)
  ⇒ Lack of first person imperatives (Quer, 2006; Kempchinsky, 2009)

- Generalizing director to perspectival center:

Declaratives/directives (commitment)	speaker
Information seeking questions	addressee
Speech/attitude reports	matrix subject

  ⇒ Semantic account of obviation effects, sensitive to presumed
  control (mind-boggling meanings, Szabolcsi 2021; Ruwet 1984,
  epistemic domain: Constantini 2016)

  (21) *Rekel si$_i$,   da   več   telovadi$_i$.
          said.M are.2 that more exercise.IMP.(2)
          int.: 'You said that you should exercise more.
                                          Slovenian, Stegovec and Kaufmann 2015

Doubts about the disjunction

- Why would this disjunctive meaning (practical vs. expressive) be crosslinguistically stable?
  - Hope from Greek: Oikonomou (2016) (5.3.1.): true imperatives are not used for wishes like *Get well soon!* (*na*- or *as*-subjunctives instead)
  - But: imperative wishes after all

    (Despina Oikonomou, email May 2018)

  (22)   [Context: me, after waiting for hours in front of the locked house, seeing my husband approaching, still out of earshot]

      a.   ah ehe   ta klidja mazi su...
            ah have.IMP the keys with you...
            'Please have the keys with you!!!'

Wish-imperatives are 'practical optatives'

- Main clause conditional antecedents (crosslinguistically frequent):

  (23) a.   If only he comes in time!   indicative optative
          b.   If only he had come in time!   subjunctive optative

- Imperative wishes require realism (indicative optatives), but also something practical:

  (24)   [Context: me, after waiting for hours in front of the locked house, seeing my husband approaching, still out of earshot]

          a.   ah ehe   ta klidja mazi su...
              ah have.IMP the keys with you...
              'Please have the keys with you!!!'

  (25)   ah as ehis   ta klidja mazi su
           ah let have.2sg the keys with you

  'it's like in the imperative I put some effort to bring about the desired result, the wish can just be a desperate wish without any attempt'

  <div align="right">(Despina Oikonomou, email May 23, 2018)</div>

- R is decisive w.r.t. a partition that is not a decision problem (-?)

Outline

Surrogate imperatives (type 2)

In many languages, main clause infinitivals, subjunctives, participles can serve some/slighly different functions associated with imperatives:

- Generic instructions
- Strong directives (command, *advice, *acquiescence, *invitation, *wish, . . .)   von Fintel and Iatridou 2017
  E.g. participles: Rooryck and Postma 2007; Heinold 2012
- Allow for referential third person subjects
- Note: to be distinguished from syntactically conditioned cases (e.g. by negation, Italian, Greek), (Kaufmann, 2019b)

Surrogate imperatives (type 2)

- Clauses with dependent marking serve as directives
- Convergence in literature:
  Can be bound by same modal operator/licensing relation with modal feature as occurs in imperatives (a.o. Isac, 2015; Stegovec, 2019; Oikonomou, 2016)
- Embedded subjunctives: modality is anaphoric ('harmonic') to speech event in main clause (Portner, 2003; Kratzer, 2006; Moulton, 2009; Moltmann, 2020, a.o.)

Subjunctive surrogate imperatives: 3p puzzle

True morphosyntactic imperatives have 2p(-ish) subjects, but subjectives allow for any person value:

<div align="right">(setting aside exhortatives, 1pPl)</div>

- <u>View 1:</u> Surrogate imperatives <u>always</u> place *See to it that...*-obligations on the addressee

  <div align="right">(Zanuttini 2008 building on English, Bhojpuri, Italian; Isac 2015)</div>

- <u>View 2:</u> *See to it that...*-obligations on the addressee tend to arise, but are not part of conventional meaning

  <div align="right">(Stegovec 2019 for Slovenian)</div>

It depends on the language: Romanian *să*/Slovenian *naj*

- Choice of action, A in control:

  (26) [Context: Teacher to assistant teacher about a rambling student]
        'He should really shut up!'/'See to it that he shuts up!'; ✓*naj*/✓*să*

- Choice of action, both A and S lack control: (after Ninan 2005 for *must*)

  (27) Ma naj spremeni ta papež že   enkrat svoj pogled na
        but NAJ change   this pope already one   self's view   on
        kontracepcijo!
        contraception
        'This pope should really change his view on contraception.'
        (not:'See to it that this pope changes his view on contraception.')
        Practical, but Instigator (= the Pope) is a non-participant

  (28) [Context: We are watching a rambling politician]
        a. #El să   tacă   din gură
           he SUBJ.PRT shut.up.3Sg of mouth
           #'See to it that he shuts up.'
           (not: 'He should really shut up.')

Focus on Romanian$_1$ with *să*= *see to it that* (Daniela Isac; Donka Farkas, p.c.) vs.
Romanian$_2$ (Simona Herdan (p.c.), who confirmed split with further speakers).

What happens in second person?

- *See to it that*-subjunctives behave like imperatives:

  (29)   Romanian să:

      a.   Inchide   uşa!
              open.IMP.2Sg door
              'Open the door!'

      b.   Să-nchizi   uşa
              SUBJ.PRT open.SUBJ.2P door
              'Open the door'/'you should open the door'

  – Isac: more indirect, adds politeness to commands, no detectable difference for invitations or permissions
  – Oikonomou observes non-immediacy effect for Greek *na*-subjunctives
  – Slovenian 2p *naj*: infelicitous; Stegovec (2019): blocked by imperatives

să -subjunctives and imperatives come apart on wishes

(30) a. Te rog fii accolo!
please be.Imp2Sg there
'Please be there!!' (✓about future, ✓settled wish)

b. Te rog să fii accolo
please SUBJ.PRT be.Subj2Sg there
'Please be there!!' (✓about the future, ✗settled wish)

Slovenian: both imperative and *naj*-subjunctives (2p blocked) can be wishes

(31) O, naj bo prosim pemetan!
O, NAJ be.3Sg please smart
'Please let him be smart!'

(32) O, prosim bodi pametan!
O please be.2SgImp smart
'Please be smart!'

First person subjects: Romanian *să*-subjunctives

First person subjectives indicate that the addressee is taken to be in control (Isac, 2015, p. 173)

(33)   a. ?Eu să   stau   lânga uşă
            I   SBJ.PRT stay.SUBJ.1Sg near   door
            'Have me stay by the door!'

        b. Eu să   fiu   asezat lânga uşă
            I   SBJ.PRT be.SUBJ.1Sg placed near   door
            'Place me by the door!'/'See to it that I'm placed by the door!'

        c. Eu să   cad   în picioare!
            I   SBJ.PRT fall.SUBJ.1SG in feet
            'Make me fall on my feet!'

First person subjects: Slovenian *naj*-subjunctives

- Slovenian: obviation effect, unless controlled by someone else; full control for addressee: *da*-construction

  (34) a. *Naj pomagam!
            SBJV help.1
            int.: 'I should help!'
        b. [You have the alarm and wake up anyways] *naj (I wake up at 6am)*

  (35) ?Naj sem jutri   prvi na seznamu!
        NAJ am tomorrow first on list
        'I better be the first one on the list tomorrow' (when dissatisified
        with my position on the waiting list)   Slovenian

  (36) Da sem jutri   prvi na seznamu!
        DA am tomorrow first on list
        'I better be the first one on the list tomorrow.'   Slovenian

Romanian *să*

- Data so far confirm Isac's assumption that Romanian directive *să*-subjunctives hardwire Addressee = Instigator ($\approx$ practical imperatives)

- But *să*-subjunctives can appear in practical questions:

(37) A: Să   stau   sau Să   plec?   – B:
          SUBJ.PRT stay.SUBJ.1 or   SUBJ.PRT leave.SUBJ.1? –
      Să   pleci.
      SUBJ.PART leave.SUBJ.2
      A: 'Should I stay or should I leave?' – B: 'You should leave.'

Addressee = Director (usual interrogative flip), Speaker = Instigator

(38)   Interrogative interpretation (roughly):
        { according to you, I should bring it about that I stay, according to
        you I should bring it about that I leave}

Instigator parameter Romanian *să* vs. Slovenian *naj*

To be implemented with anaphoric presuppositions, e.g. (van der Sandt, 1992; Asher and Lascarides, 2003)

(39) Slovenian surrogate imperative *naj*

    a. <u>presupposes</u> EAC $\wedge$ EUC $\wedge$
(expressive or
practical for Instigator x: x = ?)

    b. <u>at-issue</u>: $\square^R p$

(40) Romanian surrogate imperative *să*

    a. <u>presupposes</u> EAC $\wedge$ EUC $\wedge$
practical for Instigator x: x = ? $\wedge$ (x = A or x = S)

    b. <u>at-issue</u>: $\square^R p$

(choice of participant S/A: whoever is not the director)

Summary and to-dos

- Family of directive constructions: close gap between source of selection (director: practical knowledge) and control of events (instigator)
- Built compositionally, components differ – inventory, points of variation?
- Morphosyntactic imperatives reliably follow 'the disjunction' (practical/expressive), but not all surrogate imperatives do (Romanian)
- Imperative wishes retain a practical component: that decisive modality (minus decision problem) might be active in expressive imperatives
- Compare surrogate imperatives with their embedded counterparts under different types of predicates
- Default-subjective modal verbs (*beki, must*) have imperative leanings

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