Permitting Permissions

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ABSTRACT. The aim of this paper is to get rid of a nasty ambiguity between commands and permissions associated with imperatives (necessity/constraining of options vs. possibility/widening of options). I argue that a uniform semantics in terms of necessity together with certain assumptions about the context can account for the different effects on the pragmatic side. The difference is explained by employing either a speaker or a hearer centered ordering source, together with basic assumptions about speaker and hearer interests. *if you like*-phrases frequently found in permission imperatives are analysed as indicating a hearer centered ordering source and filtering out one of the presuppositions required for a permission usage. It is argued that *any* in imperatives constitutes only an apparent contradiction to a necessity semantics for imperatives.

1 The Janus face of imperatives

Studies in various areas of linguistics have noticed that across the languages of the world imperatives[1] come with a puzzling range of illocutionary potential (cf. Palmer 1986, Merin 1991, Rosengren 1992). Not only do they vary in expressing commands (the default interpretation for (1a)), warnings, wishes, requests, but they are also found to express permissions (1b) and permission-like concessives (1c):

(1) a. Read this!
    b. (It starts at eight, but) come earlier if you like! (Hamblin 1987)
    c. All right, don't come then! (If you think you are so clever.)

This cutting across necessity and possibility comes as a nasty surprise to anyone who assumes that the functional potential of linguistic forms is determined by their (semantic) meaning. Consequently, it has been taken as evidence that the semantics of imperatives has to be so underspecified that ultimately not much of interest can be said about it. The illocution expressed is to fall out from the context (cf. e.g. Rosengren 1992). Unfortunately, many approaches remain pretty underspecified themselves about how this is to happen, and

[1] I assume that *imperative* denotes a crosslinguistically identifiable sentence type (viz. a linguistic form).

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why, after all, commands or requests (all corresponding to necessity) seem to be associated with imperatives as a default.

I show first how both underlying semantics and effects on the state of a discourse are usually assumed to differ for commands vs. permissions. Having taken a closer look at imperative permissions, I argue that despite *prima facie* appearance a uniform semantics in terms of necessity can be given. In order to spell this out, I resort to the framework of graded modality as worked out in Kratzer (1991). Rather well-known pragmatic aspects consisting in the interplay of presuppositions about speaker and hearer wishes, shared knowledge and cooperativity (cf. Lewis 1979, van Rooy 1997) are then used to account for permission readings of imperatives. Aloni's (2004) treatment of choice offering imperatives is mentioned to show that free choice *any* does not falsify a uniform necessity semantics for imperatives. But it is also argued that her approach as it stands fails to account for the Janus face described here.

2 Permissions and commands

Leaving concessives (cf. 1c) aside for the moment, the command and permission usages of imperatives are similar to the so called *performative* usages of modal verbs (viz. when they do not merely inform about existing commands and permissions, but rather change the way the world is like in that respect). (1a) and (1b) can thus be paraphrased as (2a) and (2b) respectively:

(2) a. You must read this.

b. You may come earlier if you like.

Let's look at a slightly modified version of Lewis's (1979) implementation of commands and permissions as a language game between *master* and *slave* to see why this apparent ambiguity is so troublesome. We will consider the set of all those worlds[2] the participants in the conversation (jointly) cannot distinguish from their actual world w (the Stalnakerian *Common Ground*, CG). Furthermore, each world w determines a set of permissible worlds, p(w), that verify whatever is commanded in w by the master. The *permissibility sphere* PS (the set of worlds that verify whatever the participants to the communication mutually believe to be commanded by the master) is then gained by interesecting p(w) for all worlds w in CG.

As for the semantics of modal statements, (2a) denotes the proposition in (3a), (2b) denotes (3b).[3] It is easy to see that an ambiguity along these lines would be disturbing, since (3a) invokes logical entailment, while (3b) invokes compatibility.

(3) a. $\|\text{must } \phi \| = \{w \in W \mid \forall v \in p(w){:}\ v \in \| \phi \|\}$

[2]Worlds are assumed to come with their full histories. Since the time index is not relevant to the questions considered, it is ignored for simplicity. If not specified otherwise, 'world' in the following is to be understood as 'world plus time of evaluation'.

[3]$\|\cdot\|$is the standard interpretation function, mapping expressions onto their intension in a model M with an assignment function g and a context variable c left implicit.

b. $\|\text{may } \phi \| = \{w \in W \mid \exists v \in p(w)\colon v \in \| \phi \|\}$

In order to keep descriptive and performative usages of modal verbs as similar as possible, both can be seen as assertions, the performative effect falling out from mutual assumptions (the master speaks truthfully, he is never mistaken about aspects of his own psyche, e.g. his current wishes, etc.) (cf. e.g. Kamp (1978); Merin (1992) and van Rooy (2000) for criticism). In the following I will resort to such an *assertoric treatment* of performativity, but nothing hinges on that.[4]

Irrespective of how the change in PS is brought about, it must involve two different operations: commanding ϕ intersects PS with ϕ, permitting ϕ adds to it some (but not all) ϕ -worlds.[5] Which worlds exactly are to be added constitutes Lewis' famous *problem about permission*. A to my mind satisfactory solution of determining the next best worlds with the help of a reprehensibility relation is given in van Rooy (2000).

Van Rooy rejects an assertoric treatment though. Relying on a dynamic framework, each sentence is associated with an update potential to a given state of information. Thus, *must* ϕ and *may* ϕ directly constitute functions on PS, the former restricting it to ϕ -worlds (just as a (successful) assertion of ϕ would restrict CG to ϕ -worlds), the latter enlarging PS so as to contain the least reprehensible ϕ -worlds.

At this point it has to be said clearly that a semantic analysis of imperatives in terms of these update functions leaves no hope for reconciling command and permission cases as given in (1). The fact that the one is used to restrain, the other to enlarge PS is an irreducible fact about their constituting a command vs. a permission. I therefore resort to a treatment relying on static truth-conditions. It is thus the propositions associated with (2b) and (2a) that cause them to determine the respective type of update described - as I take it correctly - by van Rooy.

Next, I argue that, despite the apparent ambiguity in modal force as found in (1a) vs. (1b,c), the imperative is associated with a uniform semantic object. The challenge is first to find an appropriate propositional content, and second, to explain why a uniform quantificational force should mostly result in constraining PS, but could sometimes also serve to enlarge it.

3 A closer look at imperative permissions

First, it should be noticed that, crosslinguistically, usages linked to obligation seem to constitute the default for imperatives (cf. Palmer 1986). It is only when modified by particles or when conditionalized (*if you like*) that they assume permission readings.

[4] Alternatively, one could resort to Lewis' original idea of the *truthful master condition*. It guarantees that the permissibility sphere adjusts itself to the commands and permissions of the master. Since performativity is common to all usages of the imperative, this condition could well be associated with the imperative form.

[5] Following the tradition of deontic logic, Lewis assumes that permitting results in rendering permissible a class of actions the opposite of which had been commanded before. Thus, before permitting ϕ, all permissible worlds lie within $\neg\phi$.

Given this asymmetry, it comes as a natural move to somehow reduce all imperatives to expressions of necessity in semantics, resorting to the linguistic or communicative context for bringing about permission effects in pragmatics.

Frequently found conditionalization by *if you like* strongly suggests analysing apparent permissions as commands conditionalized on the addressee's wishes (cf. 4b). For cases of permission imperatives without such an antecedent we would then assume a covert *if you like* to be retrievable from the context.

(4) a. Come earlier if you like.

b. If you want to come earlier, (*given what your wishes are/given what my wishes are/...*) you must come earlier.

Despite its initial plausibility, this gives the wrong result (cf. Hamblin 1987). Even if the hearer wants to come earlier (and even if the speaker is aware of that), (1b) (repeated here as (4a)) does not create an obligaton for the hearer to come earlier; in contrast to that, (4b) would and is therefore no paraphrase of (1b/4a).

Under closer inspection, *if you like*-antecedents do not only fail as explanations for permission readings, but rather constitute a problem in their own right. (5) shows that they don't conditionalize permissions either. The permission granted by (5) is independent of the hearer's wish for it; viz. if the speaker found out that the hearer came earlier despite not wanting to (e.g. because the taxi driver hadn't respected the speed limit), the hearer cannot be blamed for having done so - the permission to come earlier is in force nevertheless.

(5) If you like, you may come earlier.

The uniform treatment of imperatives proposed in the following section will allow us to integrate the insights into conditionalized permissions into recent discussion about two types of conditional antecedents.

4 The Analysis

4.1 A uniform semantics for imperatives

As to the semantics of modalized propositions, I rely on the framework of graded modality in terms of possible worlds as spelled out in Kratzer (1981, 1991)[6]. Necessity and possibility are now defined with respect to two contextually given parameters: a modal base f (giving for each world a set of propositions describing which worlds should be taken into account) and an ordering source g. The latter also gives a set of propositions (an *ideal*, $g(w)$), and induces a partial order on the worlds in $\cap f(w)$ in terms of *closeness to that ideal*, (6)[7].We

[6]As was pointed out to me by an anonymous reviewer, the idea goes back to van Fraassen (1973:7): *whether an ought-statement is true depends on two factors: the set of alternative possibilities we are evaluating, and the scale of values by which we rate them.*. For further elaboration see also Lewis 1973.

[7]Note that this definition does not compare the number of propositions verified by a particular world but rather the set of propositions verified (vs. e.g. van Rooy's (2000) reprehensibility ordering). Therefore, the ordering obtained is only partial. This is crucial if my analysis is to be applied to larger ordering sources.

define $O(f,g,w)$ as the set of worlds in $\cap f(w)$ that are optimal with respect to $g(w)$.

(6) ordering source $\leq_{g(w)}$: $\forall v, z \in W : v \leq_{g(w)} z$ iff
$\{p : p \in g(w)$ & $z \in p\} \subseteq \{p : p \in g(w)$ & $v \in p\}$

(7) $O(f,g,w) = \{v \in \cap f(w) \mid \forall z \in \cap f(w)$: if $z \leq_{g(w)} v$ then $v \leq_{g(w)} z\}$

We will only be concerned with cases where we can safely assume that $\forall v \in \cap f(w)$ there exists $v \in O(f,g,w)$ such that $v \leq_{g(w)} u$ (*Limit Assumption*, Lewis (1973:19ff)). Under this assumption,necessity and possibility in Kratzer (1991) reduce to (8a) and (8b) (the contextually given parameters f (modal base) and g (ordering source) are indicated as superscripts to the interpretation function):

(8) a. $\|\Box p\|^{f,g}(w)$ iff $\forall v \in O(f,g,w)$: $v \in p$
b. $\|\diamond p\|^{f,g}(w)$ iff $\exists v \in O(f,g,w)$: $v \in p$

Let's relate this to imperatives. Abstracting away irrelevant details, I assume that imperatives contain an imperative operator IMP which is combined with a proposition having the addressee as its subject. I want to argue that IMP expresses necessity, but comes with certain restrictions on both modal base and ordering source.

In general, imperatives are about what the world is going to be like if wishes, desires and the like are taken into account. But speakers are realistic in so far as taking into consideration what the participants to the conversation jointly believe their actual situation to be like. I will therefore assume that the modal base for imperatives is grammatically specified to be what the participants to the conversation going on in world w jointly believe to be the case in w (call it f_{cg}). Therefore, $\cap f_{cg}(w)$ is CG for all w in CG.

What the imperative does then is order the worlds in CG according to some contextual parameter. In many cases, this is *speaker centered*, viz. g is constituted by what the speaker wishes or desires. At least, that is the normal case for commands and requests (cf. 9). On the other hand, if the bringing about of the action mentioned in the imperative is of no importance to the speaker, the ordering can also be induced by wishes, goals or desires of the hearer. Such *hearer centered* ordering sources seem to come into play with recommendations, advices or instructions (cf. 10).

(9) Read this! = *Given how the world can evolve, and given what I want, you must read this.*

(10) A: How can I draw a venn diagram with latex?
B: Use pstricks. = *Given how the world is and can evolve, and given your goal of drawing a venn diagram, you must use pstricks.*

So, in general, both speaker and hearer centered concepts are possible values for the ordering source g in imperatives.[8]

[8] If we want to rely on a completely assertoric treatment of imperatives (rather than explicitly forcing self-adjustment of the information state to the imperative's truth conditions), it might be necessary to assume a speaker epistemic embedding of such a hearer centered ordering source. Instead of *given what your wishes are* it might be necessary to use *given what I assume your wishes to be.* I'll leave that aside for further discussion though.

Taking into account these restrictions about what constitutes the modal base and what are possible ordering sources, the semantics for the imperative operator can now be given as in (11). It is an instance of Kratzerian necessity (cf. 8a) with the modal base specified to f_{cg} and g constituted by either the speaker's or the hearer's wishes, goals or desires. As shown in (12), this provides a straightforward analysis of commands.

(11) $\|\text{IMP}\|^{f,g} = \lambda p \lambda w. \forall v \in O(f_{cg}, g, w)\text{: } v \in p$

(12) $\|\text{Go home!}\|^{f,g} = \|\text{IMP go-home(addressee)}\|^{f,g}$, with g = *what the speaker wants.*
$(\lambda p \lambda w. \forall v \in O(f_{cg}, g, w)\text{: } v \in p)(\lambda \text{w.go-home}_w(\text{addressee})) =$
$\lambda p \lambda w. \forall v \in O(f_{cg}, g, w)\text{: go-home}_v(\text{addressee})$

The semantics derived in (12) says that the worlds that conform best to what the speaker wants are worlds in which the addressee goes home. This seems satisfactory for the command case.

4.2 Explaining permissions and concessions

It is much less obvious how (11) should cover the permission readings of imperatives. Shouldn't they semantically correspond to possibility as in (8b)? What I will argue now is that, when combined with the right presuppositions, necessity with respect to the hearer's wishes as an ordering source can indeed account for the permission readings.

'IMP ϕ' gets a permission reading only under the following circumstances (*presupposed* understood as "entailed by the CG"):

- it is presupposed that ϕ is among the wishes of the hearer[9]
- it is presupposed that the speaker is against the hearers realizing ϕ
- it is presupposed that the hearer wants to please the speaker

But then, the set of worlds that optimally fulfill the hearer's wishes is counterfactual. Since his wishes in the actual world are conflicting, something would have to be different for all of them to be realizable. (This is a classical scenario of practical inference, cf. Kratzer (1981:65)).) Most likely, the worlds the hearer would like best are among those where the speaker does not have any preference against ϕ. Doing ϕ would not conflict with obeying the speaker then, and the hearer could happily do both. Nevertheless, reality is not that nice.

The three presupposition describe CG as being partitioned the following way: The entire common ground lies within *the speaker is against the hearer's realizing* ϕ (thus, all ϕ worlds lie in the complement of *the speaker is pleased*[10]). Furthermore, the entire common ground has the hearer having the wishes *that* ϕ and *that the speaker is pleased.* Both ϕ and

[9] At that point confusion as to what the hearer wants lurks around the corner. We have to distinguish between *the hearer wants* ϕ (taken as a primitive here, cf. Heim (1992:194)) for a semantic analysis), from ϕ *is a necessity with respect to the hearer's wishes.*

[10] Throughout this discussion I take this to mean *pleased with the behaviour of the hearer.*



Figure 1.1: CG, ordered by g(w) = $\{\phi$, *the speaker is pleased*$\}$.

that the speaker is pleased are non empty (though mutually exclusive). (Remember that ϕ is not empty because we assumed imperatives to be realistic; *the speaker is pleased* should not be empty because there wouldn't be much point in complying with his imperatives if it made him angry anyway.)

Now, ordering CG with respect to the wishes of the hearer means choosing g(w) = $\{\phi$, *the speaker is pleased*$\}$. This results in the picture given in figure 1.1. It is easy to see that the set of worlds that come closest to the ideal of what the hearer wants in w (the union of the two white segments) does not decide ϕ. It has both worlds where the hearer follows his desire to ϕ and pays the price of offending the speaker, and likewise worlds in which he pays duty to the speaker's wishes and goes without ϕ. Therefore, neither ϕ nor $\neg\phi$ is a necessity with respect to CG ordered by the wishes of the hearer.

'IMP ϕ' with g = *what the hearer wants* is therefore easy to falsify (by (11) we get the proposition in (13)):

(13) $\|\text{IMP } \phi \|^{f,g} = \{w \in W \mid \forall v \in O(f_{cg}, g, w)\colon v \in \| \phi \|^{f,g}\}$

Our world w is not within that set (and therefore, given the nature of f_{cg} and the presuppositions assumed, no world in CG is). For a counterexample, pick $w_1 \in$ speaker-wishes and $\neg\phi$. Every world that is better than w_1 according to the ideal g(w) (= $\{\phi$, *speaker is pleased*$\}$) would have to make true at least the same and possibly more of g(w) than w_1 does. Since there is no world in $\cap f_{cg}(w)$ that would make true the same and more propositions of g(w) than w_1 does and $w_1 \in \neg\phi$, ϕ is not a necessity in w with respect to f_{cg} and g = *what the hearer wants*.

Therefore, as it stands, an update with IMP ϕ would lead to inconsistency. Since speaker and hearer tend to be cooperative (cf. Lewis 1979), the hearer tries to accommodate. The problem so far is that *the speaker is pleased* implies $\neg\phi$. In principle, this allows for two possible strategies of making IMP ϕ true with respect to w, $\cap f_{cg}$(w) and the hearer's wishes g(w). The hearer could either assume that the speaker has given up his preference for $\neg\phi$ or he could give up his wish to please the speaker.

The first strategy seems to be the unmarked one, and it makes the right predictions for the ordinary imperative-as-a-permission case. Giving up the presupposition that the speaker is against the hearer's realizing ϕ means to enlarge the common ground by adding (the closest) ϕ-worlds that verify *the speaker is pleased* (contraction via ϕ and *the speaker is pleased*). Thus making both propositions in g(w) true, they consitute the g(w)-best subset of $\cap f_{cg}(w)$. It is easy to see that the imperative as calculated in (13) then comes out as true.

The second strategy gets applied in the more marked cases of concessive imperatives (cf. 1c). In a way, they seem to express more the speaker's giving up on the hearer than his giving a real permission. In this case, *the speaker is pleased* is omitted from the ordering source.[11,12]

Since the first strategy is the usual accommodation (allowing for cooperative conversation to continue), the second one has to be marked by prosodic clues. Note that particles (German *doch*, *eben*) or modifiers (*if you like*, *go ahead*,...) don't distinguish between the two strategies of accommodation. They only help to single out the correct (hearer buletic) ordering source.

Accounting for permission readings by employing a hearer oriented ordering source also explains the puzzling effect of *if you like*. As argued in section 3, it does not cause the permission granted by the speaker to depend on the hearer's having the wish. In that sense it is akin to (15a) in the contrast translated from Hare (1971:248). In (14a) the obligation is understood to truly depend on the hearer having the wish or not, while (15a) gives a means how to realize the wish mentioned in the antecedent. This comes out more clearly by the latter, but not the former implying the sort of (pseudo-)contraposition given in the b-clauses.[13]

(14) a. If you want sugar in your soup, you should get tested for diabetes.

b. $\not\rightsquigarrow$ If you don't get tested for diabetes, you don't get sugar in your soup.

[11]To be absolutely precise one should distinguish between just omitting the proposition from the ordering source (in a way the speaker saying: "just disregard your wish to please me"), or an accommodation that would indeed involve contraction of CG by *the hearer doesn't want to offend the speaker*, thereby adding the closest worlds where he does not care about offending the speaker or not.

[12]This has an interesting parallel in the behaviour of the German modal *sollen* which normally expresses necessity (cf. 1a). But when occuring in verb-first sentences it invariably gives rise to precisely this type of concessive reading (cf. 1b; see Önnerfors 1997):

(1) a. Er soll sich die Grippe holen!
he shall REFL the flu catch.INF

He shall catch the flu! (order/curse)

b. Soll er sich doch die Grippe holen!
shall he REFL PRT the flu catch.INF

Ok then, so he may just as well catch the flu! (given that he doesn't listen to me)

[13]Since thereby describing the inner proposition of the consequent as a necessary means to achieve the goal mentioned in the antecedent, the b-sentences are called *anankastic conditionals*, cf. von Wright (1963).

(15) a. If you want sugar in your coffee, you should call the water.

b. $\rightsquigarrow$ If you don't call the waiter, you don't get sugar in your coffee.

The standard treatment for conditionals (Kratzer 1991) hypothetically adds the proposition in the *if*-clause to the modal base f of an overt modal in the matrix clause (or alternatively of a covert operator of epistemic necessity). This makes correct predictions for (14a). In order to account for cases like (15a), Sæbø (2002) has proposed to assume that instead of restricting the modal base, the antecedent can also serve to both indicate and modify the ordering source (g is set to *what the hearer wishes* and is modified by (hypothetically) adding the complement of *want*, namely *you have sugar in your coffee*).[14]

This is of course exactly the effect wanted for imperatives to convey permissions. First, the wishes of the hearer are made salient as the ordering source. Second, given that *if*-clauses filter presuppositions (cf. Geurts 1999), *if you like*-modifiers take care of the first presupposition (namely that the hearer wants ϕ). It doesn't come as a surprise then that in many languages such a reduced antecedent (ϕ is most naturally left out) is used to facilitate permission readings.

5 *Any* encouraging further research

At first glance, the behaviour of imperatives with respect to *any* seems to stand in the way of the proposed semantic reduction. Imperatives pattern with possibility modals in licensing free-choice *any*, whereas necessity modals don't (cf. Aloni 2002):

(16) a. You may/$^{\#}$must pick any flower.

b. Pick any flower!

Interestingly enough, the only proposal worked out for sentences like (16b), Aloni (2004), relies on a uniform necessity based semantics for imperatives as well. It differs though in assuming sensitivity to a set of alternatives computed in addition to the traditional denotation. A trivial set of alternatives amounts to necessity with respect to the background A_w (somewhat vaguely set to *the desires of (one of) the participants to the conversation*).

(17) $\|\text{IMP } \phi\| = \{\text{w} \mid \forall\alpha \in \text{ALT}(\phi){:}\exists \text{w'} \in A_w{:}\text{w'} \in \alpha \;\&\; \forall \text{w'} \in A_w{:}\exists\alpha \in \text{ALT}(\phi){:}\text{w'} \in \alpha\}$

Existential operators give rise to non-trivial alternatives. Aloni relies on Kadmon and Landman's (1993) analysis of *any* in terms of a special indefinite[15] introducing a free variable that can then be bound by either an existential or a generic quantifier. The set of alternatives introduced by the complement of IMP in (16b) is {*you pick flower*$_1$, *you pick flower*$_2$, … }. The situation described by the imperative is then characterised by (i) each alternative (= each choice of a flower to pick) being permissible, and (ii) one flower

[14] Cf. von Fintel and Iatridou (2004) and Huitink (2005) for discussion of the interaction with other goals of the hearer.

[15] It induces *widening* of its domain of quantification according to some contextually specified dimension and requires that this should lead to a *stronger* statement than quantification over the original domain would have.

being picked at each of the permissible worlds. This is indeed the most straightforward interpretation for (16b). But instead of a permission to pick a/every flower one chooses to, it is rather a command to pick one flower, while leaving the decision about the flower involved entirely to the addressee. This differs from the possibility modal which lacks the requirement that some flower has to be picked in any case. Therefore, *any* does not provide conclusive evidence for imperatives semantically expressing possibility.

Nevertheless, Aloni's (2004) elegant treatment fails to capture a second type of *any*-imperatives. If the verb carries a presupposition (as e.g. *confiscate* presupposes *finding*), *any* doesn't induce free choice for the addressee. (18) most naturally expresses an obligation to confiscate all the guns the addressee might find.[16]

(18) Confiscate any gun!

We may thus conclude that *any* in imperatives still lacks a satisfactory analysis. Nevertheless, I believe to have shown that it is not the necessity part of the imperative semantics that creates the problems. If anything, it is the still poorly understood semantics of *any*.

6 Conclusions

I have argued that the apparent ambiguity between necessity and possibility readings for imperatives is best treated by assuming a uniform semantics in terms of necessity. Given that a context meets certain well-circumscribed conditions, it can still amount to a permission pragmatically. Two possible strategies of accommodation give rise to permission readings vs. permission-like concessive readings. Avoidance of a crosslinguistically widespread ambiguity, reduction of the marked option 'possibility' to the default 'necessity', and the integration of *if you like*-modifiers speak in favor of the proposed analysis. It has been pointed out that a satisfactory understanding for *any* in imperatives is still lacking. *Any* does not provide conclusive evidence for semantic possibility in imperatives though.

[16] Attempting to analyse this within the framework of Kadmon and Landman (1993) most likely commits one to assume that the indefinite is bound by a generic operator, cf. (i). As desired, this gives us a trivial alternative set and the imperative boils down to necessity with respect to the background. Nevertheless, the generic quantification within the scope of the imperative seems spurious. Furthermore, it is completely unclear why ordinary indefinites as in (ii) can only get an existential reading.

(i) IMP [[GEN_x [gun(x) & find(addressee,x)] $\rightarrow$ [confiscate(addressee,x)]]

(ii) Confiscate a gun!

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